Overview
Someone is driving your login form with a script. The requests are well-formed, the user agent says Chrome, and the addresses rotate through a residential proxy pool, so rate limiting alone either misses them or starts catching real users.
Every field a bot controls, it lies about. What it cannot easily change is how its TLS and TCP stack behaves, and that is what Synapse matches on: the fingerprint travels with the client, not with its address.
When you see this
- Failed logins climb while each source address sends only a handful of requests.
- The User-Agent names a browser, but the TLS or TCP fingerprint is not that browser's.
- One JA4 fingerprint shows up across many unrelated source addresses.
- A rate limit either never triggers or starts limiting real users.
Steps
- 01
Watch who is connecting
Attach the terminal view to the running agent and send yourself a normal login first, so you know what a real browser looks like. Then watch the attack traffic arrive next to it.
Attach to the running daemon synapse --terminal - 02
Find the fingerprint the requests share
Behind address rotation or CGNAT, ask the agent about an address as a whole: aggregate returns every connection it saw from that address, with its fingerprints. Compare the JA4 across a few attacking addresses.
EventBridge: everything seen from one address curl --unix-socket /var/run/synapse-control.sock \ -X POST http://localhost/query \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"src_ip":"198.51.100.23","aggregate":true}'Every layer that touched one address jq -c 'select(.src_ip == "198.51.100.23")' /var/log/synapse/events.log - 03
Ask the classifier
The fingerprint classifier answers whether a client's JA4+ fingerprint is malicious, with a probability. It needs an -ml build. Read the model card before you wire its output straight to a block.
/etc/synapse/config.yaml mode: "proxy" ml: fingerprint_classifier: enabled: trueDecisionIs the fingerprint shared by a real browser build your users run?Yes Do not block it: you would block everyone on that browser. Rate limit or challenge at the WAF instead.
No It belongs to the tool. Block it by fingerprint in the next steps, whatever address it arrives from.
- 04
Slow the login path at the WAF
A credential-stuffing rule usually wants rate_limit rather than block: the login endpoint is legitimate, it is the rate that is not. Counters are per rule and per client address: requests allowed per period, then duration seconds of 429. Where you are unsure, challenge with a CAPTCHA.
WAF rule, action rate_limit or challenge http.request.path == "/login" and threat.score > 30WAF rule for sources the feed already condemns threat.score > 80 and threat.advice == "block" - 05
Drop the tool by its fingerprint
A smart firewall rule on the fingerprint installs a kernel block, so a scanner that changes address every request is still stopped by the thing that does not change. Start the rule with the log action to prove it on live traffic, then switch it to drop with fingerprint scope.
Smart firewall rule, log first, then drop ja4 == "t13d190900_9dc949149365_97f8aa674fd9" - 06
Confirm it took effect
Watch the drops arrive rather than waiting for a pipeline to confirm them.
Everything dropped, newest first jq -c 'select(.action == "drop") | {ts, layer, source, src_ip, rule_msg}' \ /var/log/synapse/events.log | tail -20
Common mistakes
- Blocking a fingerprint that real browsers share. A fingerprint is not an identity: every user of a browser build has the same one.
- Blocking a shared egress address. A CGNAT or corporate NAT address is many people; prefer the fingerprint or a combination of signals.
- Relying on rate limits behind a load balancer without setting proxy.trusted_proxies: the bucket keys on the L4 peer, which is the balancer.
- Sending the classifier's score straight to a drop before reading what it was measured at.
Escalate when
- Any account that logged in successfully from the attacking fingerprint.
- Attempts against privileged or service accounts.
Where this stops working
- A determined adversary can mimic a fingerprint. This raises the cost of automation; it does not make it impossible.
- The agent sees less than the proxy: without terminating TLS you get the client-side fingerprints but not the request, so no WAF and no CAPTCHA.